The mechanism of quantum mechanics is considered as the principal method of quantum key distribution for transmitting a cryptographic key between users in unconditionally secure communication. In this paper, simulation and enhancement of the performance of SARG04 protocol have been done in terms of error correction stage using multiparity rather than single parity. In addition, the suitable length of subblock was selected depending on the values of quantum bit error rate and round number. Dynamic linear-feedback shift register circuits have been used to extend the final key. These circuits are dynamically generated by the final key. A unique linear circuit is created for each generated key.
INTRODUCTION
An ideal cipher needs to offer unconditional security of symmetric key protocols without difficulties of key distribution. For this reason, many current protocols use an asymmetric key cipher (such as RSA) to exchange a key which offers a better efficiency in terms of throughput (James, 2012) . Conventionally, one-time pad provides perfect information security, but it has a big problem concerning the length of the random key which should be equal to the length of the plaintext (Jabbar and Ahmed, 2013) .
Multiparity quantum key distribution (MQKD) is a key distribution protocol where the same key is distributed to different parties using quantum mechanism. In the jargon of digital cryptography, MQKD can refer as a conference key distribution protocol establishes a common key among a number of users forming a conference (Abudhahir et al., 2012) .
Since the first protocol, proposed by Benette and Brassard in 1984 (BB84) , the quantum cryptographic (QC) protocols have been studied widely in recent years. It is observed that most of the later QC protocols are variants of BB84. Many problems incurred during the practical implementation NOT gates. Xiangyu et al., 2017 , proposed an efficient rate-adaptive reconciliation protocol suitable for practical continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) systems with timevarying quantum channel. This protocol changes the code rate of multi-edge type low-density parity check (LDPC) codes. (Mario et al., 2017) Multi-edge LDPC codes with low code rates and long block lengths were proposed for CV-QKD, to extend the maximum reconciliation distance between the two remote parties. Hua-Lei et al., 2016 , provided the exact relationship between the secure key rate and the bit error rate in a six-state SARG04 protocol.
In this paper, a new method for error correction is proposed using multiparity instead of single parity and expanding the final key using privacy amplification depending on dynamic linear-feedback shift register (LFSR).
MATERIALS AND METHODS OF QKD

Selection of a Suitable Block Length
The step of selection of a suitable block length proposed to speed up the error correction process using multiparity instead of single parity in SARG04 protocol.
After making sure there are no intrusions on the data, the sifted key division process takes place into subblocks. The length of the subblock is identical on both (sender and recipient) to ensure the correction process is successful. In addition, the length of each subblock will be dynamically chosen depending on the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and round number. The proposed of suitable block length selection shows that the block length is 5 ≤ L ≤ n where n ≤ sifted key length. The reason behind choosing 5 bits as block length is the adoption of using multiparity rather than single parity. Obviously, multiparity cannot be applied (apply single and multiparity at the same time) when the subblock length (2 Bits). Therefore, a 5-bit size was chosen for the calculation of multiparity. The single parity is calculated from the locations (5, 3, and 1), while the double parity is calculated from the locations (2 and 4). This means guessing the key when exchange the parities between sender and recipient on the intruder is so difficult. In this proposed, we apply the bisection search algorithm to find the error after exchange the parities between sender and recipient. This requires many rounds; in each round, a new block length is applied.
The formula used in this simulation to calculate the subblock length is given by: (Jabbar and Ahmed, 2013) .
Where, j represents the current round number.
After applying many cases of simulation, this formula gives a good result and corrects the errors in a few rounds. After applying 20 rounds on the sifted key, the sender and recipient could correct all errors in the key successfully. This formula is suitable and effective to calculate the subblock length.
Privacy Amplification Stages
At this stage, both users should calculate the safety parameter (SP) as an assurance to remove the information leaked during the error correction stage and to minimize the intruder information.
So the final key length will be:
Final key length =1/4 raw key -Revealing portion to estimate QBER -N of discarded bits during error correction -W -SP.
Where S is the SP and W is the estimated Intruder information about the raw key.
Apply Stream Ciphering on QKD Protocols in Simulation Program
Another step has been added to SARG04 protocol to further secure the key and to exploit the key as efficiently as possible. In this paper, the final key used to generate dynamic LFSR by depending on the final key to select shift registers. Although the LFSR changes dynamically as the key length changes. Moreover, the expansion of the key is not as big as in traditional cryptographic methods (e.g. a gigabyte key can be generated from a 96-bit key). A small expansion is used for several reasons, and the most important reason is to avoid knowing even a small part of the circuit that generates this key. Therefore, different parts of the output of the used circuit were taken with the shifting. The size of the generated key in QKD is often relatively large. As a result, the LFSR will be very large and this will cause the problem of saving space for key storage and maintain a key to this size. Consequently, QBER is used to determine the amount of expansion. Whenever the amount of error is small, the amount of expansion will be large according to the following proposed relations: Where the numbers (6, 9, 12, and 15) represent the amount of expansion, meaning that the key will expand to 6 times, for example, if the error rate is >9%.
Generating Dynamic LFSR Circuits
Let's assume the final key after applying all phases of (QKD) protocols was [100110010101].
The proposed algorithm, which generates dynamic LFSR, assumes that the final key is polynomial, then the algorithm will convert these bits to pseudo-random expanding form.
Hence, the above final key will be converted to the following form:
The circuit is shown in Figure 1 . The proposed method will generate the circuit and the key will expand according to the generated circuit. Moreover, there will be a unique and new different circuit for each key.
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The simulation design of SARG04 protocol is based on Figure 2 , which summarizes all the possibilities of the four cases which can be sent:
From Figure 2 , we conclude the following:
The probability of detecting sent state in column (1) is P1 = 0 because both cases {(↑, ↘}) and (↑, ↗})} have been neglected. The probability of detecting sent to state in column (2) is P2 = 1/2 because two out of four cases were detected. The probability of detection in column (3) is P3 =0. The probability of detection in column (4) and (5) is P4 = 1/2 and P6 = 0. The probability of detection in column (7) is P7 = 1/2. Finally, the probability of detection in column (8) is P8 = 0. Thus, the overall probability of detection is as follows: P P P P P P P P P Total = + + + + + + + 1 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 * ( ) Since only two cases can be detected from 8 cases, which represent 2/8 from the whole cases. This means that the length of the key after the sifting process is 1/4 of the length of the transmitted key.
RESULTS
Simulation Results of SARG04 Protocol
This protocol is simulated according to the following assumptions: 1. Four types of channels (perfect channel, low noise channel, medium noise channel, and high noise channel) were applied on SARG04 protocol by assuming that the channels are lossless. 2. There is no intrusion. 3. There are no rules to be exchanged between the two parties. 4. In the sifting stage, the four quantum states are declared. 5. Raw key length (5000-40000) bits.
Stream Ciphering Simulation Results
As previously mentioned, it is necessary to add another step of security (stream ciphering) to the SARG04 protocol to Figure 9 shows the generated polynomial equation that is used to generate dynamic LFSR. The figure also indicates that the final key length before expanding is 641 bits, but after applying stream ciphering expanded to 3846 bits. The expansion was 6 times while the polynomial can expand the key much more, but it could expose the used circuit (LFSR) to be disclosed by an attacker (Figures 3-8 ).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the SARG04 protocol has been simulated, and some improvements were added to the SARG04 protocol at the error correction stage. Multiparity is used instead of single parity with some modifications to calculate the subblock length to be ≥5 bits. Furthermore, the simulation It has also been shown that the error correction stage may leak some information to the intruder which can be avoided during the SP stage. This stage makes the algorithms that correct the error tend to perform better. The other optimization of the SARG04 protocol is the key expansion where the final key length has been increased for optimum length. The key distribution systems use a one-time pad to encrypt messages and need a long key. Therefore, improved stream ciphering was used in this paper to apply key expansion. It will use the final key to generate the pseudo-random expanding circuit dynamically (there will be a new expansion circuit for each generated key). The expansion will be restricted to QBER to prevent an intruder from detecting the expansion circuit. The higher QBER leads to lower expansion and vice versa.
